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The paper highlights the acute nature of the problem of grand business corruption and 
the major legal developments in anticorruption legislation nationally, regionally and 
internationally. While accepting the utility of the black letter analysis of 
anticorruption laws the author argues that it is equally worthwhile that legal writers 
establish the moral abhorrence of international corruption across human cultures and 
forms of civilisation. It is suggested that there is ample basis for doing so by distilling 
the philosophical, religious and cultural jurisprudence of corruption from the corpus 
of indigenous African religion, Islamic thought, Christian theology and cultural values 
common to human societies. It is noted that the complicity of western societies in 
providing home for stolen and illegal wealth systematically transferred from the 
developing world is at odds with this shared moral vocabulary of human civilisations. 
It is argued that the utility of establishing the moral imperative of the global 
anticorruption movement is to put a stop to this phenomenon and to ensure the 
expansion of the jurisprudence and international criminal jurisdiction against gross 
abusers on the same basis as is presently done against pirates, terrorists hijackers and 
other persons engaging in acts regarded as delicta jure gentium. 
 




1. The problem of corruption in International Business Transactions 
 
This article argues that the prohibition of corruption in international business 
transaction and the developing international law that provides for the tracing, seizure 
and return of the proceeds of corrupt enrichment is based upon a common language of 
international morality. The article also argues that there is adequate basis for the 
internationalisation of the jurisdiction over corrupt businesses and their executives 
that is fast approaching that which applies to pirates, terrorists and other international 
delinquents. 
It has become clear since the middle of the last century that the phenomenon of 
stolen capital flight is one of the principal causes of underdevelopment. The stolen 
wealth of developing states and the proceeds of bribery and corruption in their 
participation in international business over the last half century has found safe haven 
in the banks and financial institutions of western states. Much of western business 
activities and investment in many developing states take place in a pervading milieu 
of international corruption involving bribery and corruption of key decision makers 
and other business players.  
The unholy cycle of corruption is complete when the corrupt officials and 
businessmen export their ill-gotten wealth back into the coffers of offshore accounts 
mostly based in western countries and tax islands. Since the end of the colonial era, 
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after the Second World War when the outlines of this international mischief became 
to be noticeable no meaningful regime of prevention was created to stop the rot. 
Sophisticated national and international legislation to stem the practice are a very 
recent development. There is an argument that international practice of money 
laundering has been pressed to the advantage of western economies and this is why 
the legal regime to trace stolen wealth is left in its infancy.1 Countries of the southern 
hemisphere have been systematically defrauded for decades by their corrupt leaders 
with the proceeds finding haven in western banks. States which have experienced 
high profile Swiss banking scandals or have tried to recoup their losses from foreign 
banks include Ethiopia, Honduras, Vietnam, Cambodia, Panama, Bolivia, Algeria, 
Nigeria, and Kenya.2  
Corruption at both the petty and grand levels is a widely recognised feature of 
developing countries.3 The incidence of grand corruption involves multinationals, 
politicians and elites of the civil and military class. The connection between 
corruption in the developing world and the active involvement and perhaps cultivation 
of local actors by foreign elements has been poorly examined in literature. Grand 
corruption requires interaction between foreign elites who give bribes, kickbacks and 
various forms of illegal inducement in order to gain undue advantages in business. 
This interaction is what we choose to refer to as grand-business corruption. This may 
take the form of bribes for lucrative procurement contracts, construction contracts and 
mining and other extractive industrial activities.4  
The frequent discoveries of slush funds and bribery networks maintained by 
leading Western corporations are indicative of the depth of the problem.5 The 
multinationals involved in major scandals and investigations in the last ten years 
include Siemens in up to 20 countries,6 Hyundai and Samsung in South Korea,7 BAE 
                                               
1 The World bank has estimated that the amounts involved in money laundering are in the region of US 
$800 Billion –US$ 1 trillion and according to the IMF money laundering accounts for 2 to 5 percent of 
the world GDP. US Senator Carl Levin admits: "It is estimated that half of that money comes to the 
United States". James Petras, “ ‘Dirty Money’ Foundation of US Growth and Empire - Size and Scope 
of Money Laundering by US Banks” La Journada [Mexico], 5/19/01 also available at 
http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/economy/053101_banks.html 
2 Jean Ziegler, Switzerland Exposed (Allison and Busby, 1978) p. 39 
3 A Report on the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2004 appears to single out 
political parties among the governmental sectors and institutions most affected by corruption. The point 
to be made however is that; it is the leadership elite in many of these states that participates whether it 
is monarchical, military or a combination of any of these. See Indira Carr, “Corruption In Africa: Is 
The African Union Convention On Combating Corruption The Answer” Journal of Business Law 
(2007) p. 111, 123, 124. See also In Rose-Ackerman, S, Corruption and Government, (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1999) p. 27.  Reports and materials of the Transparency International are 
available at www.transparency.org. Release date of report: December 9, 2004; United Nations, The 
Global Programme Against Corruption: Anti Corruption Toolkit “What is Corruption? The Meaning of 
“Corruption” and a Survey of its most common forms,” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs {Development 
Cooperation} of The Netherlands and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway) p. 13. 
4 Rose-Ackerman, S, Corruption and Government, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999) pp 
27, 91. 
5 Simon Romero, “Halliburton Severs Link With 2 Over Nigeria Inquiry” The New York Times, 
Saturday, June 19, 2004; BBC, “Nigeria Probes Siemens Bribe Case” available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7105582.stm; Estelle Shirbon, Update 1-Nigeria to investigate 
Siemens bribes scandal Mon Nov 19, 2007 available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/companyNewsAndPR/idUSL1931303520071119; Chudi Offodile, 
“Halliburton Scandal: The Nigerian Angle” Vanguard (Nigeria) Friday, April 24th, 2009 
6 David Gow, “Siemens prepares to pay $2bn fine to clear up slush fund scandal” The Guardian, Friday 
25 January 2008 http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2008/jan/25/1 visited 25 June 2009; Chris 
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Systems in Saudi Arabia and a few other countries8 Haliburton and Kellogg Brown & 
Root (KBR) in Nigeria9 and Lucent Technologies in China.10 A writer aptly notes: 
 
“It is a matter of fact that major deals between a government office and a 
foreign supplier will on occasions involve money exchanging hands, beyond 
and above payments specified in the contract. Indeed, this would happen rather 
frequently not to say most of the time in certain countries and very few nations 
could claim to be totally immune from this plague”.11 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
Mellor, “Siemens slush fund scandal deepens” Techworld13 December 2006 
http://www.techworld.com/news/index.cfm?newsID=7571visited 18 June 2009. 
7 As a result of these and similar disclosures South Korea has sent two former presidents to jail. Roh 
Tae Woo (1988-93) was charged with amassing at least $650 million in political "slush funds" from the 
giant conglomerates that dominate Korea's economy, and Chun Doo Hwan (1980-88) for among other 
reasons gathering even more money (upwards of $1 billion). Bruce Cummings, Korean Scandal, or 
American Scandal? Japan Policy Research Institute JPRI Working Paper No. 20 available at 
http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp20.html visited 25 June 2009 
8 BAE Systems, which was formerly called British Aerospace and one of the world's leading producers 
of advanced weaponry systems has to the admission of the Tony Blair government serious allegations 
to answer regarding a £20 million ($33.4 million) slush fund to finance prostitutes, gambling trips, 
yachts, sports cars etc. for its most important clients the Saudi royal family and their intermediaries. 
Evidence has also since been discussed in various fora that members of the British government were 
aware of the bribe arrangement, but looked the other way. See Sasha Lilley, BAE System's Dirty 
Dealings, CorpWatch November 11th, 2003. 
9 Two U.K. Citizens, Wojciech Chodan and Jeffrey Tesler, were charged with participation in a bribery 
scheme in US Department of Justice indictment commenced March 5, 2009. According to the 
indictment, According to the indictment, Tesler was hired in 1995 as an agent of a four-company joint 
venture that was awarded four EPC contracts by Nigeria LNG Ltd., (NLNG) between 1995 and 2004 to 
build LNG facilities on Bonny Island. The government-owned Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC) was the largest shareholder of NLNG, owning 49 percent of the company. 
Chodan was a former salesperson and consultant of a United Kingdom subsidiary of Kellogg, Brown & 
Root Inc. (KBR), one of the four joint venture companies. At so-called "cultural meetings," Chodan 
and other co-conspirators allegedly discussed the use of Tesler and other agents to pay bribes to 
Nigerian government officials to secure the officials’ support for awarding the EPC contracts to the 
joint venture. According to the indictment, the joint venture hired Tesler to bribe high-level Nigerian 
government officials, including top-level executive branch officials, and another agent to bribe lower 
level Nigerian government officials, including employees of NLNG. At crucial junctures before the 
award of the EPC contracts, KBR’s former CEO, Albert "Jack" Stanley, and others allegedly met with 
three successive former holders of a top-level office in the executive branch of the Nigerian 
government to demand they should designate a representative with whom the joint venture should 
negotiate the bribes. In pursuance of the scheme Tesler allegedly wire transferred bribe payments to or 
for the benefit of various Nigerian government officials, including officials of the executive branch, the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC), Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas Limited (NLNG), and 
for the benefit of a political party in Nigeria. If convicted on all charges, each defendant faces a 
maximum prison sentence of 55 years. See Department of Justice, “Two UK Citizens Charged by 
United States with Bribing Nigerian Government Officials to Obtain Lucrative Contracts as Part of 
KBR Joint Venture Scheme” Press Release Thursday, March 5, 2009 CRM (202) 514-2007, TDD 
(202) 514-1888 available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2009/March/09-crm-192.html visited 12 
October 2009. 
10 ABA Section on International Law,” U.S. Enforcement Agencies End 2007 with Three New FCPA 
Settlements”,  Anti-Corruption Committee Newsletter December 2007 p. 2; Paul French, “A bunch of 
dodgy bankers” Ethical Corporation  available at 
http://www.ethicalcorp.com/content.asp?ContentID=3758 visited 24 June 2009. 
11 Ezio Bonsignore, “Defence Trade and the Misuse of Justice”, Vol. 32 Military Technology, 2008, 
Issue 6, p. 8. 
African Journal of Law and Criminology Vol. 1 Number 1 February 2011, pp. 78 - 99 
81 
 
The illegality of money laundering, and corruption in international business 
transactions and grand corruption is confirmed in a network of national, regional and 
international laws. Developments in Soft Law include the G8 commitments,12 the 
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative’ (EITI),13 the UN proposals in 1977 (Code 
of conduct on Transnational Corporations) which contained demands for detailed 
financial and non financial items for disclosure, the Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human 
Rights,14 and the European ‘Vredeling’ Directive, introduced in 1980 which mandated 
a level of information sharing between management and labour in transnational 
enterprises has been no different.15 
Treaty and quasi-treaty law that are designed to prevent and prohibit 
international business corruption, money laundering and grand corruption include the 
Inter-American Convention Against Corruption adopted by the Organization of 
American States in 1996;16 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Official in International Business Transactions adopted by the OECD in 1997;17 
Criminal Law and Civil Law Conventions on Corruption adopted by the Council of 
Europe in 1999;18 ICC Rules of Conduct on Extortion and Bribery in International 
Business Transactions;19 the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Corruption;20 and the United Nations Convention on Corruption adopted in December 
2003.21  
National laws of significance to research in this area include the US Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA");22  Public Bodies Corrupt Act 1889,23 (which covered 
                                               
12 Official website of the G8 Presidency of the Russian Federation in 2006, ‘Fighting High Level 
Corruption’ St. Petersburg, July 16, 2006 < http://en.g8russia.ru/docs/14-print.html>; Note also the Sea 
Island Compacts which were entered into with Nigeria, Nicaragua, Peru and Georgia.12 
13 Countries that have implemented this initiative include Nigeria, Ghana, Azerbaijan and the Kyrgyz 
Republic. Joseph A Schumacher, ‘Introducing Transparency into the Oil Industry: The Quest for EITI’ 
(2004) 4(3) Global Jurist Advances, 2.  
14  Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with 
Regard to Human Rights, UN ESCOR, 55th Sess, Agenda Item 4, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2 (26 August 2003). 
15  Proposal for a Council directive on procedures for informing and consulting the employees of 
undertakings with complex structures, in particular transnational undertakings [1980] COM (80) 
423 final; [1983] OJEC No C297/3 amended in 1982; OJEC No C292/33; and [1983] OJEC No 
C217/3. 
16  Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, 29 March 1996, 35 ILM 724. 
17  OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Official in International Business 
Transactions, adopted 21 November 1997. See, <http://www.oecd.org>. 
18  Criminal Law and Civil Law Conventions on Corruption adopted by the Council of Europe in 1999, 
opened for signature, CETS 174 (entered into force <http://www.coe.int>. 
19  Adopted 1996; revision of 1977 Rules of Conduct.  The 1977 Rules prohibited extortion and 
bribery in connection with obtaining or retaining business. New rules prohibit extortion or bribery 
for any purpose. See, <http://www.iccwbo.org>. 
20  African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, adopted on 11 July 2003 
(entered into force 5 August 2006) (‘AU Convention’). This instrument has received impressively 
high acceptance among African states signed by 41 out of 53 African Union Member States, of 
which only 24 have actually ratified it. Ratifying states as at 2009 are: Algeria, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Comoros, Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Niger, Rwanda, South Africa, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Zambia, and. Zimbabwe. 
21  United Nations Convention Against Corruption, opened for signature 31 October 2003, UNTS, 
(entered into force 14 December 2005) (‘UNCAC’). See, <http://www.un.org>. 
22 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et seq.  
23 Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889 1889 Chapter 69 52 and 53 Vict. 
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both active and passive bribery);24 the Prevention of Corruption Act 190625 applied to 
both private and public sector bribery the Prevention of Corruption Act 1916,26 The 
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001;27 UK Bribery Act (the "Bribery Act")28 
in force from April 2011  In the African continent notable development include the 
Zambian Prohibition and Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2001, Nigerian 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act 200229; Money Laundering 
(Prohibition) Act, 2004; Money Laundering Decree 1995; Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters within the Commonwealth (Enactment and Enforcement) Act 
198830 the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency Decree 1989.31 
 
2. Morality of Jurisdiction over Money laundering 
 
The general trend of our discussion so far has been to argue that the 
imperatives of the recent soft law and treaty law on corruption, transparency and 
accountability is that there is a duty upon states to cooperate in the prevention and 
repatriation of stolen funds. The success of this argument stands and falls upon a 
proper forensic analysis of the various streams of laws and legal jurisprudence 
referred to and the recognised principles of law that govern international jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, where there is wanton disregard for the law as it is and where a 
receiving state refuses to cooperate based upon its interpretations of the law as it 
stands it becomes necessary to ask the question, what apart from the law necessitates 
the cooperation of receiver nations to assist in the return of stolen funds. The answer 
ought to be that international morality does demand cooperation in the prosecution of 
the conspirators and facilitators of the odious crimes under discussion. The assertion 
of Sir Harold Nicolson that "[t]here does not exist such a thing as international 
morality" is inapplicable to the policing of international money laundering and 
corruption.32  
The requirements of a strong moral content in the actions of states in their 
regulation and coordination of businesses and economic policies has been thrown into 
sharper focus in the last few years and was perhaps heralded by the epoch signifying 
collapse of Enron and Anderson. The so called ‘credit crunch’ and the near collapse 
of the world economic as a result of the banking practices and business lending have 
further placed morality on a strong pedestal along with law in the regulation of 
international economic and business life. This realisation has certainly produced 
reactions in the academia and in the accounting law and business disciplines. 
Corporate scandals are used as valuable teaching tools in the various disciplines. The 
preferred view is that held by Arnold Wolfers who wrote; "the ‘necessities’ in 
international politics, and for that matter in all spheres of life (that states) do not push 
                                               
24 The definition of public body in the 1889 Act was widened by the Prevention of Corruption Act 
1916 so that local and public authorities of all descriptions could be included. 
25 Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 c. 34 (Regnal. 6_Edw_7). 
26 Prevention of Corruption Act 1916 c. 64 (Regnal. 6_and_7_Geo_5). 
27 See, Terrorism Act 2000 (UK) c 11, Part 12 on Bribery and Corruption. 
28 Bribery Act 2010 c. 23. 
29 Full text available at http://www.nigeria-
law.org/Economic%20And%20Financial%20Crimes%20Commission%20(Establishment)%20Act.htm 
30 Full text available 
https://www.unodc.org/tldb/showDocument.do?documentUid=8223&country=NIR&language=ENG 
31 Decree No. 48 of 1989, now an act of parliament CAP N30 laws of the federation of Nigeria 2004 
32 See Herve Stolowy, “Nothing Like the Enron Affair Could Happen in France!” (New Economics 
Papers Law and Economics  2006-01-29 http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:heccah:0815&r=law 
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decision and action beyond the realm of moral judgment”. It is acutely necessary in 
the battle to contain international bribery and corruption that the immorality of the 
activity be emphasised so as to counter the prevailing sanitised view of white collar 
crime. Not all commentators on this specific problem have been as forthcoming in 
their conclusions as Michael Buchannan who stated; 
 
“Money laundering is often seen as a white collar crime, and as such is 
sometimes thought of as being almost vicitmless. But as I discovered on a visit 
to Nigeria, nothing could be further from the truth. The country has suffered 
desperately at the hands of corrupt politicians who have stolen the country’s 
wealth and laundered it overseas.”33  
 
In this way the necessary causative link has been made showing that what 
previously was condoned simply as ‘boys will be boys’ and under the table activities 
of western businessmen, contractors and bankers and their counterparts in developing 
states are the very roots of much of the chronic poverty that has been afflicting the 
better part of Africa and other parts of the developing world. 
It is persuasive to assert that much of the aid given to African states by 
western nations is driven by moral conviction of the governments and peoples of the 
richer states to help and to be seen to help poorer and developing states many of 
which were colonies and vassal states of the age old western empires.34 However, 
perennial campaigns to ‘save Africa’ and ‘make poverty history’ are meaningless in 
the context of the damage which is allowed if not encouraged to happen to vulnerable 
states through a symbiotic relationship and interaction between a kleptomaniac ruling 
elite class and rogue multinationals as well as the banking and financial institutions of 
foreign receiving nations.  
As a result of the largely amoral view of the phenomenon of stolen funds in 
academic and sociological discourse the solutions that have been devised in the past 
remain unconvincing and inadequate in practice. There is little point in the periodic 
summoning up of globally televised concerts to raise paltry sums (most of which are 
of a promissory nature) for what in reality amounts to 53 independent African states 
when up to £220 billion may have been siphoned abroad from one single African state 
                                               
33 Buchanan op.cit., p. 8. 
34 Note the significance of the infamous events of the partition of Africa in the tail end of the 19th 
century.  See the General Act of Feb. 26, 1885. The mid-nineteenth century marked the beginning of 
the renewed interest in the continent of Africa by the imperialist powers of Europe. Of particular 
interest to them at the time were the hitherto unexplored central African regions comprising modern-
day Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe. This interest was based on the relentless rush for raw materials and 
investment that these territories provided for Europe’s continuing industrialization. Competition 
between the European powers was severe as they coveted the opportunities that colonial subjugation 
assured. Much interest was concentrated on the Congo region (modern Zaire) upon which King 
Leopold II of Belgium had set his sights (it later turned out to be a lucrative source of rubber). 
However, the old colonial nation of Portugal, with African interests in Angola and Mozambique 
extending back over three centuries, also saw the Congo region as its historical sphere of influence. 
International rivalry and diplomatic conflicts between the principal European powers prompted France 
and Germany to suggest the notion of a European conference to resolve contending claims and provide 
for a more orderly ‘carving up’ of the continent. The Conference met at Berlin from November 1884 
through February 1885 and resulted in the following agreement--The Berlin Act of 1885. The 
participating states that sent representatives were Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the 
U.S.A. For further reading on the history of this period and a summary of The General Act of Feb. 26, 
1885 visit http://web.jjay.cuny.edu/~jobrien/reference/ob45.html. 
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(Nigeria) in just 47 years through grand corruption. These funds inevitably end up in 
the same aid giving countries. As stated earlier such amounts is much more than the 
entire European States can give in aid even if they collectively pledge half of their 
GDPs to aid Africa over the next 50 years. If all that is done to aid the affected states, 
is to help stem the outflow of ill gotten wealth then at least two things are bound to 
occur. First, the lack of a safe haven for stolen wealth will remove the impetus to steal 
further funds at the grand scale at which it is done. Secondly even if grand corruption 
does continue as it is uncertain that any country in the world will ever reach the zero 
percent corruption among politicians and rulers then the funds will at least remain in 
the state region where it was derived and cannot but have an effect on the investment 
and banking fortunes of that state. 
It is perhaps necessary to delve into the universality of the conceptualisation of 
corruption as an essentially immoral act. This will reveal the unsatisfactory nature of 
the present strategies in the fight against corruption that appear to ignore the moral 
dimension and arguments. It may be noted that the consensus amongst the world’s 
major religions is that corruption in all its ramifications and particularly by the ruling 
elite in society is a deplorable, illegal and indeed sinful activity. The corpus of 
Christian biblical jurisprudence reveals many instances of bribery and corruption that 
attend the offence.35  
In one of the earlier biblical references to the phenomenon of grand corruption 
by civil servants; the sons of Samuels during the prosecution of a war led by Samuel 
himself committed brazen acts of corruption. This created enough justification in the 
estimation of the citizenry (in the case of the erring sons) and in the course of divine 
interventions (in the case of the Samuel himself) for the affected persons to both lose 
legitimacy to govern and to suffer dire consequences. In addition quite significantly 
the biblical precedent created an obligation to give up the proceeds of the stolen 
wealth acquired from foreign lands. In Christian theology, therefore, it is arguable that 
the imperatives of involvement in grand corruption over the wealth of other nations 
are two fold: a loss of legitimacy to govern and the obligation to offer reparations at 
the very least to God.36  
Yoruba philosophy and criminological theory is quite conclusive on this point 
in holding that the major part of the blame if not culpability in burglary if not all 
forms of stealing is to be borne by the facilitators of the crime particularly the receiver 
of the stolen property the ‘gbodegba’. The ‘Ole agbe wiri’ (fast handed thief) clearly 
                                               
35 Balak attempted to bribe Balaam to curse Israel (Numbers 22:5-7,15-17); Haman bribed Ahasuerus 
to destroy the Jews (Esther 3:9); the Chief priests successfully bribed Judas leading to the cruxification 
of Jesus (Matthew 26:15;27:3-9; Mark 14:11; Luke 22:5); Soldiers were bribed to declare that the 
disciples stole the body of Jesus (Matthew 28:12-15); Governor Felix solicited bribes from Paul (Acts 
24:26). 
36 Instances of Samuel's sons, taking bribes (1 Samuel 8:1-5). (New International Version). In 
furtherance of corruption and despite divine instructions Samuel took Agag king of the Amalekites 
alive, and all his people he totally destroyed with the sword.  But Saul and the army spared Agag and 
the best of the sheep and cattle, the fat calves [a] and lambs—everything that was good. These they 
were unwilling to destroy completely, but everything that was despised and weak they totally 
destroyed. 1 Samuel 15:8-35. In contrast to the case of the leader who engages in grand corruption the 
bible sets up the recommended profile of righteous rulers: “Now Daniel so distinguished himself 
among the administrators and the satraps by his exceptional qualities that the king planned to set him 
over the whole kingdom. 4 At this, the administrators and the satraps tried to find grounds for charges 
against Daniel in his conduct of government affairs, but they were unable to do so. They could find no 
corruption in him, because he was trustworthy and neither corrupt nor negligent. 5 Finally these men 
said, "We will never find any basis for charges against this man Daniel unless it has something to do 
with the law of his God" (Daniel 6:3-5 (New International Version)). 
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provides the acteus reus (physical elements) of stealing but as in English criminal law 
it is appreciated that the acteus reus is not the whole of the story and can indeed be 
present whereas the actor is ultimately blameless because of a lack of mens rea mental 
element of (the crime). The mens rea that may, however, be imputed to the receiver of 
stolen property in Yoruba thinking is so strong as to provide the completion of the 
elements of the offence by the receiver as if he went in to do the stealing itself and 
provide the acteus reus. This is summed up in the maxim “eni ji epo la ja ko jebi to 
eni ti o gba” 
In traditional village settings people will hide their keg of palm oil in the attic. 
Palm oil was and remains a highly valuable economic resource used for cooking 
among various other useful functions. The keg will typically be wet and very slippery 
and, therefore, difficult to handle and nearly impossible to steal alone. The receiver of 
stolen property is therefore personified in the assistance rendered by the person who 
stays on the ground or outside and stretches a lending hand to the thief who climbs 
into the attic to burgle and relieve the owner of his property. Such a criminal helping 
hand makes possible an act that will most certainly have failed without outside help or 
at least would have attracted detection by others. The maxim, therefore, expresses the 
conclusion that the stealer of the palm oil from the attic is not as guilty as the one who 
lent a helping hand to receive same. The irrefutable thinking is that without the 
assistance rendered by the receiver the thief would not attempt to steal the keg alone 
or will be unsuccessful in doing so. This reasoning is pertinent today with respect to 
the ferrying of national capital and noxious funds away from developing economies.  
 
3. Principles of State Jurisdiction and Competence over Prosecution of 
Crimes 
 
 Having argued that there is a common language of morality in human cultures 
and in international law and international relations, it remains to be seen whether this 
morality can be reconciled with classic principles of law that govern state competence 
to act or refuse to act in relation to persons and activities within their territory. 
Although sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction have for long been seen as the basic 
legitimising tools in the hands of a government that may not want to cooperate in 
repatriation of allegedly stolen wealth, it can be shown that there is nothing inherently 
incompatible in both these principles with the modern day demands to wipe out the 
safe havens for the proceeds of bribery and corruption.  
 The following arguments will show that there has always been a valid basis 
within the requisite principles upon which the moral or public policy content of states 
that guide individual states may be brought to bear upon their understanding of the 
law and practice of sovereignty and territorial and/or criminal jurisdiction. To 
establish this proposition it may be necessary to discuss the concepts seriatim and to 
show how various nations have interpreted their content in time.  
 Sovereignty in law is often considered to be the essence of the state. It explains 
the powers of a state over its entire territories and its inhabitants. The normal 
complements of state rights including the typical case of legal competence are 
described commonly as sovereignty.37 The concept is political in conception and is 
popularly symbolised by the Leviathan of Hobbes. It implies the supreme authority of 
a state, which recognises no higher authority in the region.38 Bodin developed the 
                                               
37 lan Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, (Oxford: Clarendon press, 1998) p. 106. 
38 G.S. Sachdeva “Sovereignty in the Air - A Legal Perspective”, 22 Indian Journal of International 
Law (1982), p. 398. 
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concept in terms of internal strength and external limitation of power.39 Jowitt picks 
up on this theme and defines sovereignty as: “[t]he power in a state to which none 
other is superior”.40  
 As the respected jurist Max Huber wrote in his opinion in the Island of Palmas 
Arbitration between the U.S.A and the Netherlands, “[s]overeignty in the relations 
between states signifies independence. Independence in regards to a portion of the 
globe is the right to exercise therein to the exclusion of any other the functions of a 
state...”41 This important principle can be useful for a state that insists upon 
embarking upon a large scale investigation into acts of corruption that may have taken 
place in its territory or that is directed at it from abroad. It is well within the 
sovereignty of a state to conduct targeted or general investigations within all 
legitimate means applicable under national and international laws. This may take the 
form of invasive investigations and extensive enquiries (e.g. the Nixon Watergate 
scandals). The question would, however, often arise as to whether the particular 
methods used go beyond the remits of its own national laws particularly the rules of 
human rights and the rule of law (US McCathy trials) or if they conflict with public 
international laws or the sovereignty of other states for example, the Umaru Dikko 
affair42.  
 The principle of sovereignty is also embodied in various important treaties; 
Article 2 (1) of the UN Charter gives effect to the concept.43 It is further elaborated 
upon in the provisions of the 1970 UN General Assembly Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as follows: “All states enjoy 
sovereign equality…Each state enjoys the right inherent in full sovereignty…”44 
However, Schwarzenberger rightly describes this emphasis on complete independence 
as negative sovereignty. Negative sovereignty means non-recognition of any superior 
authority. On the level of legal relations, this situation may be expressed in terms of a 
right, or freedom not to have to recognise any superior.45 It is indeed true that the 
limitation of sovereignty to its absolute extreme is as little justified as the attribution 
of a necessarily absolute character to any other notion. It must be remembered that 
just as absolute sovereignty may empower a state to carry out oppressive 
investigations so also can the principle stand for the complete non cooperative attitude 
                                               
39 lmre Anthony Csbaffi, , The Concept of the State Jurisdiction in International Space Law: A Study in 
the Development of Space Law in the United Nations, (Hague: Martinus Nijthoff, 1971), p. 50. 
40 Jowitts Dictionary of English Law, 2nd Edition, Vol 2 John Burke (ed.), (Sweet and Maxwell Ltd., 
London, 1977) p. 1678. 
41 lsland of Palmas Case (1928) R.l.A.A.; 2 829.  
42 Four men, three Israeli nationals and one Nigerian national were arrested and charged  in the UK 
with kidnapping—a common law offence—and with administering drugs with intent to kidnap 
Nigerian Ex-Minister, Mr. Umaru Dikko who had been the target of extradition requests from Nigeria. 
The then Nigerian military government wanted Umaru Dikko in Nigeria for the purposes of facing 
serious allegations of corruption. UK police inquiries also disclosed evidence which appeared to 
implicate members of the Nigerian High Commission. See Hansard, “Nigerian Ex-Minister, Mr. 
Umaru Dikko Abduction” HL Deb 12 July 1984 vol 454 cc1055-8 1055 
§ 4.15 p.m.available at http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1984/jul/12/nigerian-ex-minister-mr-
umaru-dikko visited 25 June 2009. 
43 It reads thus: “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its 
Members”. Charter of the United Nations San Francisco, 26 June 1945. In force 24 October 1945. 
Documents on the UN Conference on International Organisation, vol. 15, p. 336.  
44 Adopted by resolution 2625 (XXV) of October 24, 1970. See UNGA Official Records: Twenty-Fifth 
Sess., Supp. No. 28 (A/8028). 
45 G. Schwarzenberger, “The Forms of Sovereignty”, Vol. 10 Current Legal Problems, (1957) p. 264. 
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by another state in tracing the path of any stolen property.  
 Advocates of the stringent prosecution of corruption may take solace in the fact 
that wherever we look the omnipotent nature of sovereignty is in recession. Whether 
the focus is on human rights, exchange rates, monetary policy, arms control, chemical 
weapons, landmines, warfare, environmental control, minority rights or the tracing of 
funds the policy options open to states in any real sense have become increasingly 
constrained. Challenges to the traditional international law system of sovereignty can 
be seen in increases in depth and density of rules promulgated by intergovernmental 
organisations. These organisations are becoming more assertive vis-à-vis individual 
sovereign states both in rule making and in implementation. National courts, 
administrative agencies, and perhaps even parliamentary bodies are said to 
increasingly function as parts of cooperative regulatory and enforcement trans-
governmental networks and no longer simply as parochial national institutions.46 It is 
in this sense that it may be concluded here that the sovereignty principle assists rather 
than preclude the imperative of international anti corruption activism.  
 It remains to see how the principle of jurisdiction may also assist the tracing of 
stolen Funds and the emergent international legal regime against laundering the 
proceeds of grand-business corruption. The doctrine of jurisdiction emerged in the 
seventeenth century from the concepts of sovereignty and territoriality. Its 
development led through the statute theory to the Huber Storyan maxim and it became 
established in the nineteenth century.47 Jurisdiction in a strict legal sense denotes the 
particular rights or accumulations of rights quantitatively less than the norm, which 
the omnibus term of sovereignty covers. In other words, while the term ‘sovereignty’ 
covers the total legal personality of a state, jurisdiction refers to particular aspects of 
the substance, especially rights (or claims), liberties and powers.48 Thus, jurisdiction 
                                               
46 See Phillip Alston, “The Myopia of the Handmaidens: International Lawyers and Globalisation”, 
European Journal of International Law, No. 3 (1997) p. 435. See also Benedict Kingsbury, 
“Sovereignty and Inequality”, Vol. 9 European Journal of International Law, No. 4 (1998), p. 611. 
Other authors like Krasner believe that international legal sovereignty and Westphalian concepts of 
sovereignty have always been characterised by’ organised hypocrisy’. He agrees with the mainstream 
view, that with changes to the basic nature of the international system, the scope of activities over 
which states can effectively exercise control is declining. These include atmospheric pollution, 
terrorism, the drug trade, currency crisis, and the immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). He notes for 
instance, that technological changes have drastically reduced the costs of transportation and 
communication, which in turn, has prompted independent states to enter into conventions and contracts 
(a manifestation of international legal sovereignty) some of which have led to a compromise of their 
Westphalian sovereignty by establishing external authority structures like international institutions. He 
however, thinks that contemporary scholars are overstating the newness of globalisation in that “Rulers 
have always operated in a transnational environment; autarky has rarely been an option; regulation and 
monitoring of transborder flows have always been problematic…. There is no evidence that 
globalisation has systematically undermined state control or led to the homogenisation of policies and 
structures. In fact, globalisation and state activity have moved in tandem”. Krasner op. cit., pp. 12, 222-
223. 
47 One of the leading Roman jurisconsults, (of the early third century A.D.) J. Paulus, formulated the 
term Statute theory and it has for a long time influenced the doctrine of jurisdiction. In Italy the concept 
“statutum non ligat nisi subditos” became accepted around 1200 A.D. In effect it denied the absolute 
power of lex fori and around the 16th century writers like Bertrand d’Argentre spelt out the essence of 
the statute theory by distinguishing between potestas and jurisdiction.  The Huber Storyan maxim 
refers to the theory developed in Ulricus Huber’s work titled De Conflictu legum diversarum in diversis 
imperiis, which was written in 1948. In terms of the Storyan maxim, territorial jurisdiction means that 
each State has exclusive jurisdiction within its own territorial domain over persons, property, things 
and legal transactions done within it, including the extraterritorial activities of such persons. See 
Csbaffi op. cit., pp. 49-51, notes 51-52. 
48 Brownlie, op. cit., p. 85. 
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is the authority a state exercises over natural and juristic persons and property within 
it. It concerns mostly the exercise of this power on a state territory or quasi-territory; 
however, some states exercise a measure of their jurisdiction both exterritorialy and 
extra-territorially.49 States which claim exterritorial jurisdiction threaten punishment 
for certain acts either against the state itself, such as high treason, forging bank- notes, 
and the like or against its nationals, such as murder, arson, libel and slander.50  States 
that claim extra-territorial jurisdiction, chiefly the United States, have taken the view 
that whenever activity abroad has consequences within the state which are contrary to 
local legislation then that state may make orders requiring such things as the 
disposition of patent rights and other property of foreign corporations, the 
reorganisation of industry in another country, or the production of documents.51  
 Although it is true that in the past this sort of jurisdiction (mostly in the context 
of economic issues) has been a source of serious controversy there is enough 
precedence for the view that victim states should be able to bring to account 
corporations and persons abroad that engage in significant corruption against the state 
from abroad.52 Beale narrowly defined the concept of jurisdiction in the following 
words: “The power of a sovereign to affect the rights of persons whether by 
legislation, by executive decree, or by judgement of a Court”.53 This definition is 
narrow in that it restricts jurisdiction to powers over persons alone. In McDonald v. 
Mabee,54 Justice Holmes said that the ultimate basis of jurisdiction is ‘physical power’ 
and in Wedding v. Meyler55 he equated jurisdiction with ‘authority’.  
 Territorial jurisdiction is therefore seen as the sum total of the state’s powers in 
respect of a portion of terra firma under its governmental authority including all 
persons and things therein, and the extra-territorial activities of such persons.56 It 
denotes the power of legislation, executive and judicial competence over a defined 
territory.57 It is generally derived from territorial sovereignty, but it may also be 
                                               
49 Bin Cheng introduced two terminologies in the 1960s, which did not seem to have received sufficient 
analysis in academic literature. This, however, is not for the reason of the falsity of his analysis. In this 
discussion however, it is appropriate to revisit these terms because they still represent a unique and 
important way of looking at jurisdiction. State jurisdiction as a whole suggested Cheng, may be separated 
into two complementary elements: (a) Jurisdiction to prescribe (prescriptive legislative jurisdiction or 
jurisfaction) and (b) Enforcement prerogative jurisdiction or jurisaction (that is jurisdiction to enforce). 
Jurisfaction denotes the normative element of jurisdiction and it represents the powers a state has to 
adopt valid and binding legal norms and to concretise them with binding effect through its appropriate 
organs, whether judicial or otherwise. The spheres of validity or operative force of these norms may be 
realised ratione loci (territorial), ratione instrumenti (quasi territorial) or ratione personae (personal).49 
Jurisaction on the other hand, is the formal element of state jurisdiction and it encompasses the powers a 
state possesses to, at any place or time, physically perform the acts of making, concretising or enforcing 
laws. That is it can hold legislative assembly, set up courts or tribunals or even arrest wanted persons. 
From this point of view, “the validity of jurisaction presupposes jurisfaction, but it is possible to have 
jurisfaction without jurisaction”. B. Cheng, “The Extra-Territorial Application of International Law,” 
Current Legal Problems (1965), p. 136. 
50 See L.F.L. Oppenheim, International Law A Treatise, Vol. I eighth edition (London: Longmans, 
1963) p. 331. See also U.O. Umozurike, Introduction to International Law, (Lagos: Spectrum 
Publishing, 1993), p. 85. 
51 See for example the case U.S. v. Aluminium Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416 (1945) and U.S. v. 
Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center Inc., 133 F. Supp. 40 (1955); 134 F. 
52 See Brownlie op. cit., pp. 310-312; M.N. Shaw, International Law, Fourth Edition (Cambridge: 
Grotius Publication, 1997) pp. 483-484. 
53 Joseph Beale, “Jurisdiction of a Sovereign State”, Vol. 36 Harvard Law Review, (1922-23) p. 24.  
54 90 U.S. 230 (1916). 
55 192 U.S. 573, 584 (1904). 
56 B. Cheng, op.cit., p. 135.  
57 Umozurike, op. cit., p. 86. 
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derived from treaties, as in the case of mandated, trust or leased territories. It may also 
derive from occupatio pacifica or bellica.58 The principle of territorial supremacy 
arises from the view that a state has absolute and exclusive authority over people, 
things and events within its own territory and therefore may exercise jurisdiction over 
them in all cases.59 But the problem of what may properly be considered state territory 
for purposes of jurisdiction is not always clear. This brings us to the concept of 
territory itself. 
 International law does not actually impose restrictions on the civil jurisdiction 
of states’ courts; it is their criminal jurisdiction that international law controls by 
evolving rules and principles of competence. It follows from this that before 
considering crimes of transnational significance, especially in the area of corruption 
and money laundering it is necessary to concentrate briefly on the criminal 
jurisdiction of states under contemporary international law. It must be observed from 
the outset that the rules of international law on the criminal jurisdiction of the state are 
either permissive or prohibitive; they are not prescriptive. In other words a state is 
normally not compelled by international law to exercise its criminal jurisdiction;60 but 
when it decides to do so; then it has to comply with these rules which form the bases 
upon which its courts will be competent to entertain criminal cases. This also applies 
by extension to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over acts of bribery and 
international corruption committed by foreigners that affect the welfare of the state. 
 These bases (also called principles or grounds) of criminal jurisdiction are, 
broadly speaking, five in number. They are; (1) territorial (or territoriality) principle; 
(2) nationality principle; (3) protective (or security) principle; (4) passive personality 
principle; (5) universality principle. Since territory is relevant only in respect of the 
first basis while all the others have to do (as we shall see shortly) with the person of 
the offender or of the victim, or with the character of the offence, some writers 
classify these bases into two major groups, namely, the territorial and the extra 
territorial or personal grounds of jurisdiction. These principles will now be considered 
separately to see how they may assist or impede the work of the prosecutor in the 
tracing of stolen funds. 
 Jurisdiction here is assumed by the state of which the accused is a national. 
The competence of the state’s courts is based on the allegiance owed by the accused 
who can be a physical or juristic person to his state of origin. It is generally admitted 
that jurisdiction may be founded on nationality at the time of commission of the 
offence or nationality at the time of prosecution, provided this does not violate the 
principle of non-retroactivity of criminal laws. In cases of double nationality, both 
states have equal jurisdiction. Thus, in Tomoya Kawakita v. U.S.61 the U.S. Court of 
Appeal (9th Circuit) sentenced for high treason the accused who was a national of 
                                               
58 Cheng, op. cit., p. 135. 
59 Some authors like Starke choose to refer to these overwhelming powers as territorial sovereignty. 
The question then arises as to whether there is a possible distinction between territorial sovereignty and 
territorial jurisdiction. Oppenheim seems to have effectively answered this query by stating that he sees 
“Independence and Territorial as well as personal Supremacy (which Starke seems to have referred to 
as territorial sovereignty) as aspects of Sovereignty”. (Brackets mine). Cf. Brownlie, op. cit., pp. 105-
106. See J.G. Starke, Introduction to International Law (London: Butterworths 1984) pp. 151-152. 
Oppenheim op. cit., p. 286. See also DH Ott, Public International Law in the Modern World, (Britain: 
Pitman Publishing, 1987), p. 135. 
60 The possible exceptions to this rule exist as a result of treaty obligations voluntarily entered into by 
states such as in the prosecution of offenders with respect to the crime of unlawful interference with the 
safety of civil aviation as established in certain air treaties as discussed below. 
61 Reported in Vol. 46 AJIL, (1952) p. 147. 
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both the U.S. and Japan, and who was accused of having tortured U.S. soldiers in 
Japanese prisons. The nationality principle is, for instance, the apparent basis upon 
which Thailand's Supreme Court issued an arrest warrant against the erstwhile Thai 
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in August 2008. This principle clearly represents 
the basis upon which at least five separate cases relating to grand political corruption 
was maintained against the exiled leader even in his absence and despite his attempts 
to seek political asylum in England.62 
 Although most if not all the five main basis of criminal jurisdiction may at 
anytime be deployed as a tool in the investigation of financial and corruption crimes 
the ‘protective (or security) principle’ is one which will continue to have particular 
relevance given the high common factor of  the involvement of foreign nationals 
(corporate and natural persons) in these crimes.  Here a state assumes jurisdiction over 
aliens for acts done on foreign territory but which affect the security or other interest 
of the forum state. Thus, currency, immigration and economic offences committed by 
aliens abroad are punished by the state offended. Joyce v. D.P.P. represents also a 
classic application of the protective principle. The appellant (primarily a US citizen 
by birth and of naturalised Irish parents) having been convicted for propaganda 
broadcast for the enemy in war time, his nationality was considered immaterial under 
the protective principle during his trial under English jurisdiction.  
 The protective principle has served as the basis for different criminal 
legislation in various countries. Thus, the French Code of Criminal Procedure 
provides in Article 694 that a foreigner who outside the French territory renders 
himself guilty either as a perpetrator or as accomplice of a felony or misdemeanour 
against the security of the state or the counterfeiting of the seal of the state or current 
national monies may be prosecuted and tried according to French law if he is arrested 
in France or if the government obtains his extradition.63 There is, therefore, sufficient 
basis in state practice for victims states to seek the extradition (treaty law or political 
expediency permitting) of foreigners who are complicit in bribery and corruption 
against their national interests. It is, therefore, to be concluded that there is basis for 
using this principle to arrest and/or prosecute those who in a systematic manner 
                                               
62 BBC News, “Former Thai PM flees to the UK” BBC Website available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7553028.stm visited 5 June 2009. These include 
allegations of: abuse of power related to purchase of state land by his wife; abuse of power linked to 
government lottery scheme;abuse of power related to state loan to Burma alleged to have benefited 
family business; concealing assets; tax evasion. Members of Thaksin's family such as Pojaman 
Shinawatra and her brother were in fact  jailed for three years. 
63 French Code de la Procedure Penal adopted 1975. See also U.S. v. Archer (1943) where a Federal 
District court referred to the protective principle to justify a U.S. statute which made it a crime for an 
alien to commit perjury before a U.S. diplomatic or consular official outside the U.S. territory, even 
though this act might not be a crime in any other country. Similarly, the U.S. courts relied on the 
protective principle to assume jurisdiction for the prosecution of aliens who outside the U.S. swear 
falsely before a U.S. consul for the purpose of obtaining the necessary documents to enter the U.S. 
territory. See U.S. v. Roduguez, 182 F, Suppl. 479 (1960). Cf. Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann 
(1961) where the Israeli court held that Israel although it was not in existence during the Second World 
War could exercise jurisdiction over a Nazi war criminal on the basis of the protective principle, 
because of the defendant’s “crime against the Jewish people” which fact is the “linking proof’ between 
the forum state (Israel) and the accused (Eichmann). Israeli agents without the knowledge of the 
Argentine authorities abducted Eichmann from Argentina in 1960. He was tried, convicted, sentenced 
to death and executed after his appeal to the Israeli Supreme Court was dismissed. The Bustamante 
Code, Convention on private international law adopted in 1928 and in force between several South 
American states also provides in Article 305 that “those committing an offence against the internal or 
external security of a contracting state or against its public credit, whatever the nationality or domicile 
of the delinquent person, are subject in a foreign country to the penal laws of each contracting state”. 
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conspire to launder funds that are the receipt of the proceeds of grand-business 
corruption and other financial crimes. This is particularly true in light of the emerging 
moral legalism and international public policy that informs the content of national and 
international laws against money laundering. 
 This reasoning also directly explains the relevance of the so-called ‘passive 
personality’ or ‘Passive nationality principle’ by which an alien may be prosecuted for 
acts done abroad which are harmful to the nationals of the forum state. Although this 
is the most controversial basis of criminal jurisdiction it is likely to be used more 
frequently in this century in the fight against corruption in international business and 
in the prosecution of international money laundering offences. In the Cutting Case 
(1887), a Mexican Court exercised jurisdiction in respect of the publication in a Texas 
newspaper of material adjudged defamatory of a Mexican. Cutting, a citizen of the 
U.S. and the paper’s editor was thus, prosecuted in Mexico when he subsequently 
travelled there. The United States demanded his release, but the decision on appeal by 
which he was discharged from custody justified his release only on grounds of public 
interest, as “the offended party... has withdrawn from the action”.64 It must be noted 
in this case that the U.S. protested against the court’s assumption of jurisdiction until 
the court changed its theory to jurisdiction based on circulation of the libellous 
publication in Mexico.  
 All the dissenting judges in the Lotus Case rejected the passive personality 
principle (and the Harvard Draft Convention 1935 did not retain it either). In his 
dissenting opinion, Judge Moore said of the passive personality principle that it would 
mean that the national of one country while travelling to another takes with him for 
his protection the law of his own country, which is contrary to the well settled 
principle that such a visitor ought to put himself under the protection and dominion of 
the law of the receiving state, except that his government may intervene in case of 
denial of justice. Yet many states assert jurisdiction (through legislation) on the basis 
of the passive personality principle. This can be found for example in Article 4 of the 
Mexican Penal Code, and Article 5 of the Swiss Penal Code. O’Connell in supporting 
this basis of jurisdiction wrote that it is “a corollary of the rule that any state may 
protect its own citizens abroad”. 65 States are tempted to adopt this principle for 
various reasons, not the least of which is their perceived laxity of the domestic laws of 
other states as compared to their own in certain matters. In the context of our 
discussion of the emergent international legal regime against laundering the proceeds 
of grand-business corruption it may be argued that a state ought to be able to exercise 
jurisdiction over persons or corporations that bribe or attempt to bribe its officials or 
business nationals such as consular or diplomatic staff in the exercise of their duties 
when they are abroad. This is moreso upon the onset of an era of increasing state 
involvement in international business abroad such as in the operation of sovereign 
funds or evolvement of national oil companies NOCs into international oil companies 
(IOCs). 
 The lowest common factor that would connect the desire of a state to seek the 
prosecution of foreigners under the protective principle and the passive 
personality/security principle is the active involvement of foreign nationals who by 
sophisticated means and designs engage in a conspiracy to harm its national interests 
by corrupting the business or other interests of the victim states. Example may be 
made of the Haliburton saga in Nigeria which involved a bribery scheme designed to 
                                               
64 (1887) US For Rel., p. 751. 
65 D.P. O’Connell, International Law, 2nd Edition, Volume 2 (London: Stevens and Sons, 1970) pp. 
901, 902. 
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secure Nigerian Liquefied National Gas (NLNG) contracts. The sophistry of the 
foreign architects of the plan was described by a writer thus: 
 
It was their decision not to involve US citizens in delivery of bribes. The 
intent was to deceive their legal authorities by adopting the process, structures 
and terms of sub-contracting regimes within their home countries. It was in 
Nigeria that parties involved were in the know that for their decisions to award 
the contracts to TSKJ moneys will be offered according to their hierarchy of 
decision makers – the authorising officials getting the most and the technical 
officials getting the least... The scheme was called a “cultural committee” and 
it embraced the sales and senior personnel officers of the four joint venture 
companies as well as agents of Marubeni put together to consider how to 
implement, but hide the scheme to pay bribes to Nigerian officials. 66 
 
Conspiracies of this sort being more likely to succeed need to be prevented as 
a matter of international public policy and allowing the gradual exercise of such 
jurisdiction particularly between consenting states will go a long way in the building 
of a more robust international response against international business corruption.  
It remains to consider the possible application of the ‘universality principle’ to 
the tracing of stolen funds and the emergent international legal regime against 
laundering the proceeds of grand-business corruption. According to this principle, 
certain crimes are of such nature and seriousness as to justify their repression by all 
states as a matter of international public policy. Universal jurisdiction over piracy for 
example is well known under both customary and conventional international law: 
wherever committed and whatever the nationality of the criminal, a piratical act 
against a ship falls under the jurisdiction of any state that detains the pirate. Anybody 
who contributes to the committing of a piratical act is also a pirate. The power to 
arrest pirate ships and watch out for them is based on the principle that there is a duty 
on all states to repress piracy. Piracy is defined in Article 101 of the Law of the Sea 
Convention (1982).67 There have been efforts to extend the scope of application of the 
universality principle beyond piracy as it is known under customary international law 
to include other acts such as aerial hijacking and other acts regarded as delicta jure 
gentium. Such would include slave trading, and genocide. 68 
The unfortunate events of September 11 2001 caused a major shift in 
international jurisprudence towards the consideration of acts of international terrorism 
as international crimes the perpetrators of which may be subject of international 
jurisdiction. If the international powers are serious about the wish to make terrorism 
an international crime and one in which potentially any state may exercise jurisdiction 
over the perpetrators wherever they may be found then they ought to be amenable as 
well to the recognition of universal jurisdiction over money launderers that oil the 
wheel of terrorist funding as well as multinationals that engage in bribery and 
corruption abroad. The connection between terrorism and money laundering and 
                                               
66 John Moyibi Amoda, ‘Halliburton Saga: Which will prevail, Moral Legalism or Real Politik?’, 
Vanguard (Nigeria), 9 June 2009, p. 19. 
67 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982 xxi ILM 1245 
(1982). Hereinafter referred to as LOSC (1982). 
68The principle surely applies to war crimes. The United Nations War Crimes Commission stated in its 
Digest of Laws and Cases that: “According to generally recognised doctrine… the right to punish war 
crimes is not confined to the state whose nationals have suffered or on whose territory the offence took 
place, but is possessed by any independent state whatsoever, just as is the right to punish the offence of 
piracy”. Vol. XV Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals (1949), p. 26. 
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international corruption needs hardly be reiterated. On many levels the person who 
perverts the business and economic interests of an independent state through 
orchestrated large scale corruption and facilitates the transfer of the proceeds abroad 
is comparable to a pirate and may indeed cause more devastation than can be achieved 
by the average piratical act.  
The power to arrest pirate ships and watch out for them is based on the 
principle that there is a duty on all states to repress piracy.69  
Viscount Sankey L.C. in Re Piracy Jure Gentium has accurately expressed the 
total abhorrence of the act of piracy in international law thus: 
 
…whereas according to international law the criminal jurisdiction of 
municipal law is ordinarily restricted to crimes committed on its terra 
firma or territorial waters or its own ships and to crimes by its own 
nationals wherever committed, it is also recognised as extending to 
piracy committed on the high seas by any national on any ship, because 
a person guilty of such piracy has placed himself beyond the protection 
of any state. He is no longer a national, but hostis humani generis and 
as such …… anywhere.70 
 
In consequence of this it was also held in this case that “actual robbery is not 
an essential element in the crime of piracy jure gentium. A frustrated attempt to 
commit a piratical robbery is equally piracy jure gentium”.71 Similarly an attempt to 
corrupt government officials of a foreign land ought to carry very serious gravity as 
an international crime. Given the abject poverty that results from systematic resort to 
corruption and the many documented evil effects of grand business corruption only a 
very powerful argument ought to be able to counter the view that the persons involved 
in such acts of depredation are not in  fact hostis humani generis. It is notable that in 
the Eichmann Case (1962), the Israeli courts relied not only on the protective 
principle, but also on the universality principle in trying the accused. 
 In view of the very poor record of receiving states in bringing culprits within 
their state to book for flagrant conspiracy or gross negligence in assisting in the 
laundering of stolen funds, it is considered necessary to consider the right of the 
victim state to embark on prosecution of foreign persons under the requisite principles 
of international criminal jurisdiction discussed above.  
There are indeed convincing bases in pertinent international and comparative 
law and practice to sustain successful legal processes in the punishment of the 
perpetrators and facilitators of grand business corruption wherever they may be found. 
Although it is conceded that the exercise of universal jurisdiction over such crimes 
may at present be largely seen as speculative, it is perhaps good international public 
                                               
69 Piracy is defined in Article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ((LOSC) 
Montego Bay, 10 December 1982 xxi ILM 1245 (1982)  as consisting of: (a) any illegal acts of 
violence or detention, or any act of depredation committed for private ends by the crew or the 
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft and directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship 
or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft, (ii) against a ship, aircraft, 
persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state; (b) any act of voluntary participation 
in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (c) 
any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-paragraph (a) or (b). 
70 Re Piracy Jure Gentium [1934] A. C. 589. 
71 Umozurike op. cit., p. 112. 
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policy to extend the principle aut dedere aut punire to persons who help in facilitating 
bribery abroad and/or receiving stolen funds from other lands.72  
The banking officials and other persons who are involved in providing safe 
haven for the stolen funds from another state ought to be aware of the possibility that 
they may be committing a very serious offence under the criminal laws of that state 
and may be brought to prosecution and punished under the criminal laws of the victim 
state. In accordance with this view where the attitude of the receiver state towards 
prosecuting bankers and other officials involved in receiving stolen funds is 
lackadaisical it is indeed possible for the concerned victim state to begin extradition 
requests in accordance with international law and/or bilateral or other multilateral 
arrangements. It may be noted that at least among friendly developed states there is 
already good basis for such exercise of international jurisdiction. 
There are of course many reasons for the current wave of closer cooperation in 
the tracing of stolen monies between receiver states and developing states. Factors 
that may be suggested include (a) the imperatives of control over the financing of 
terrorism73; (b) the imperatives of combating the illicit trade of traffic in drugs and 
narcotics (c) globalisation and communications revolution such as the prevalent use of 
the Internet which means that suspicions, allegations and incidents of corrupt activity 
are circulated freely and widely, thus bringing wider recognition of the problem74 (d) 
the realisation by largely democratising developing states with increasingly educated 
and literate populace of the extent of the problem and effects of grand corruption; (e) 
Greater involvement and influence of civil society in the political affairs of nation 
states as well as in their influence on international affairs;75 (f) Instalmental 
improvements to the development of ethical standards in international business 
transactions and investment practices both in the European Union and other leading 
western financial centres and International Financial Institutions. It is indeed 
surprising that it has taken this long for the deliberate and lapses of receiving nations 
to attract opprobrium. It had for long been recognised that there is a connection 
between receiving jurisdictions and many of the familiar problems of international 
life. A writer draws attention to this noting that: “When drug dealers are caught in 
America, their Swiss accounts figure in their dossiers. The money for the arms traffic 





                                               
72 An example of the applicability of the principle aut dedere aut punire is in relation to terrorists 
suspected of taking part or organising hijacks for whatever purpose. This is contained in Article 7 of 
the Montreal Convention (1971), which provides that a State in whose territory an alleged offender has 
been found shall either extradite him or be obliged without any exception whatsoever, and whether or 
not the offence was committed in its territory, prosecute him. 
73 As a writer put it “it wasn't until the attacks of 11 September 2001 that concerted, coordinated 
international efforts began to catch the launderers. Among the many lessons learned from that day was 
that without laundered money there would be no terrorism, so regulations were passed to try and stop 
the funding of militant activities” Michael Buchanan, Dirty Money World Agenda: The BBC 
International Journal Feb 2006 p. 8. 
74 Indira Carr, op.cit., 
75 The work of Transparency International for instance in bringing the problem of Corruption to 
national and international discussion can hardly be over exaggerated. The epithet second most corrupt 
nation in the world shocked the normally stoic Nigerian cultural conscience and successive 
governments have tried to move the country away from this image as much as possible. 
76 Ziegler op.cit., p. 53-54. 





The thing that is becoming clear is that cleaning the Aegean stables of 
international business corruption and grand corruption is not as impossible as it once 
appeared. That in itself is a major victory for campaigners in this field of legal studies 
and anti-corruption activism. In very modest gestures that have taken place in just the 
last five years the financial rewards in terms of saved or repatriated funds in the 
selected jurisdictions we have discussed above has run into billions of dollars. If such 
savings are sustained this may provide the much needed funds to turn around some 
economies.  
Moral legalism is therefore, a necessary but not sufficient condition to trace 
stolen and corrupt funds across the globe. The rules of law in national codes and 
international soft and treaty laws are crucial in the attainment of these goals. These 
legal rules are very formidable as at present but they need to be further developed 
based on a common response of both developed and developing states. The emerging 
moral legalism and regime of cooperation is a particularly welcome development for 
vulnerable economies and developing states to the extent that the emerging 
international regime may allow them to repatriate valuable funds from around the 
world. Further development of the law must proceed with a deep involvement of the 
shared international morality. Although legal opportunism and real politic may 
continue to impede progress in this area, the days when the problem was left 
unaddressed is perhaps gone forever.  
There is enough in the shared moral civilisation of mankind and the positive 
rules of public and private international law to prevent the rampant exercise of 
international bribery, corruption and money laundering particularly where it targets 
vulnerable peoples and states. 
 The corrupt classes in the international system have been exposed to be just as 
vulnerable and apprehensible as are common thieves. Senators, governors and heads 
of states have been exposed as far from invincible.77 The powerful signals this has 
sent around the consciousness of the world’s populations should not be 
underestimated. On occasion, however, the drama grabs both national and 
international attention with disturbing vehemence.78 On the whole, it is arguable that 
lives have been saved as result of the conservation of funds and perhaps a redirection 
of the energies of government to their legitimate duties rather than as it appeared the 
pursuit of monies as an end in itself.  
                                               
77 Recent examples of high value convictions from Nigeria alone include the conviction of former 
Minister of Petroleum Dan Etete in France. A French court sentenced him in absentia to three years in 
prison and a fine of 300,000 euros ($440,000 ) for money laundering. The Paris criminal court also 
issued an arrest warrant for Etete, who served as Petroleum Minister under Late General Sani Abacha 
from 1995 to 1998, and is currently living in Britain. Etete reportedly fled Nigeria for France in 1998 
after the death of the military ruler.  
Etete was convicted of using 15 million euros in funds obtained fraudulently to purchase properties in 
1999 and 2000 including a Paris apartment, a chateau in northwest France, and a luxury villa in the 
upmarket Paris suburb of Neuilly. A French businessman Richard Granier-Defferre, was convicted of 
complicity and sentenced to 12 months in jail and a fine of 150,000 Euros. 
78 Witness the apparent suicide of the erstwhile South Korean leader Roh Moo-hyun as a result of the 
investigations conducted by the country’s Supreme Prosecutors’ Office. Ironically the late leader while 
in office had the image of a popular champion of clean government. Martin Fackler, “Recriminations 
and Regrets Follow Suicide of South Korean”, New York Times May 25, 2009, p. A4 of f the New 
York edition. Also available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/25/world/asia/25iht-korea.html?_r=1 
visited 5 June 2009. 
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Most importantly it is safe to conclude that the direction of the development of 
international law is towards the internationalisation of jurisdiction over perpetrators of 
corruption in international business including the beneficiaries of grand corruption 
especially where their conduct is on a gross or systematic scale. The threshold that 
determines international involvement is still unclear but it is suggested that certain 
useful criteria such as the amounts involved, the egregiousness of the activities and 
the possibility of wide-ranging or cross boundary damaging effects may be used to 
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